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THE SOLE AND SEPARATE USE IN PENNSYLVANIA.
That it is a commendable purpose on the part of a father or
mother to so settle the estate destined for a daughter who is married, that she cannot, tinder the inducements of the husband, dispose of it, a considerable number of the decisions of our highest
court concede. A married woman may be persuaded or coerced by
her husband and she may unwisely or weakly yield to this perstiasion or coercion. Therefore let us make this impossible when the
benefactor wants to make it impossible, virtually say the courts, by
establishing the principle that property, real or personal, given to
the sole and separate use of a married woman, shall be inalienable.
But how long inalienable? Only so long,-the answer is, and it
seems sensible,-as the danger of marital influence, which the attempt is to thwart, lasts. It would follow, apparently, that, if an estate were given to a daughter for her sole and separate use and she
were not married until some later time, the trust and the inalienability would be suspended, until marriage,'but would operate upon
marriage, and if the coverture telminated by the death of the husband or by a divorce, the trust and the inalienability would be again
suspended, until a second covertuie should make it again operative.
If it is proper to allow a parent to protect his daughter from
the undue influence of one husband, why not of two? If the one husband lives 40 years, the injury to the public from tying tip the estate would be as great, surely, as if lie had died in 20 years, and another husband were then taken, the coverture under whom lasted 20
years more. Are the courts so averse to second marriages of wid-
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ows that for this reason they will refuse to them the protection of
this principle of non-inalienability? Or do they think that fathers
and mothers, in settling property on their daughters, cannot and
therefore do not, desire and intend that their daughter's property
shall be safeguarded, if they are so unwise as to take a second husband? Assuming that the law is made by practical men for practical
persons, it is really difficult to see why protection may not be extended against successive husbands, as wisely as against one.
A man has a daughter who is not married when he writes his
will, and dies. She may be young and then unmarriageable, or she
may be old enough to marry and may have a more or less vague intention to marry. But the courts, sovereignly legislative, have ordained that no possible safeguard against a future husband's malign influence over her, may be adopted by her father. If she were
only married but a day; nay, if she were only engaged to be married to a man of whom he knew nothing, whom probably, he had
never seen, he could make her estate inalienable. But since she is
not, but is only going to become married, she must, in taking the
husband, take all the risks attendant upon his masculine ascendancy.
Can anything be said in defence of such a position? It will hardly
he suggested that no sole and separate use should be created, unless the settlor or testator knows the personal and business qualities
of the husband. These he often cannot know. They are developed with time and circumstance.
Why should the older or otherwise more fortunate daughters
who already have husbands, be protectable by the aegis of inalienability, and the unmarried daughters not? In order to preserve
their property from the influences from which their older sisters' is
preserved, they must abstain from marriage altogether.
Perhaps the answer is, not so! The father may make a spendthrift trust for an unmarried daughter. He may so settle his estate
that only the income of it can be paid to her, and that payment to
her own hands will alone discharge the trustee? But this trust is as
available for a married as for an unmarried daughter. Why should
the father have the selection of either of two, or of both. for the
former, and only of one for the latter?
It has not yet been decided that a spendthrift trust, to operate
only during coverture, not to operate until, nor after coverture, would
be valid. It would almost certainly be decided invalid. The parent
of the daughter who is unmarried, must therefore contemplate either
that she shall abstain from marriage, or suffer the risk of loss of her
property from martial influence, or he must deprive her of power over her estate when she is discovert, a discrimination between daughters for which there is not the slightest justification, on his part, or
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on the part of those who make the law; and which could have beet
avoided by recognizing, as courts in other jurisdictions do, the validity of sole and separate uses, for any actual period of coverturc. although it may be preceded by a period of singleness.
But, oddest position of all, is that which is found in Neale's Appeal,' and in Quin's Estate,2 viz. that though the daughter is in fact
married when the estate passes to her or to a trustee for her, never.
the less, if when the will was written, she was not covert the sole and
separate use created by it shall be utterly void. A dying man, whose
daughter is then unmarried, cannot protect the property he is
giving her from a husband whom she may and probably will take, and
on the other hand, a father who is not about to die, but who wants to
provide for the contingency of death, cannot effectively create a sole
and separate use for a daughter who is unmarried when the will is
In
written, although she becomes covert before it takes effect.
Neale's Appeal, the child was nine years old when the will was written in 1871. She married in her I7th year, that is in 1879. Her father, the testator, died Nov. 27th, i88o. In Quin's Estate, the will was
executed May 27th 1872. The daughter was married in 1875. The
testator died Sept. 6th, 1886. In both cases, the gift to the daughter
was to her sole and separate use; in both the daughter was married
when the will began to operate; in both the execution of the will
preceded the marriage; in both the use was declared void. Why?
The objection to sole and separate uses is that they take from the
owner of land, during a portion of the period of ownership, the customary and desirable incident of ownership, viz, the power of alienation. Despite its impolicy, the withdrawing of this power from the owner is justified, because of the greater impolicy of making it impossible to exempt a wife's property from the effect of the sinister influence
of a husband. But, in the cases referred to, there never was a time,
while the property was the daughters', when they were not covert.
The mischief of conferring an estate, and at the same time withholding the power to alienate it, except during coverture did not exist.
When the estates passed to the daughters affected by the anti husband
trust there were in fact husbands. How then is the denunciation of
the trust justified, simply because when the wills were written, there
were no husbands? Mercur C. J., in defence of it cites authorities to
the effect that a separate use "cannot be created unless she is covert."
But when is a use "created"? Surely not until the estate on which it
operates is created. And when is that created? Does the writing of
a will, which simply expresses a present intention to pass an estate at
death create or pass that estate? The intention that qt some future
1104 Pa. 214.
2144 Pa. 444.
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time, at the intender's death, an estate shall conic into existence i.i
surely not the "creation" of that estate. The estate, if it ever shall
be cteated, will be created (a) by the present will, (b) by future abstinence from making some other disposition either by will or by
revocation or by disposal of the property while alive, (c) by the testator's death, and (d) by the survival of the devisee. The process of
"creation" is not completed except by death.
In Quin's Estate, it is true, Clark J. repeating the doctrine of Mercur .. that the marriage must be in existence "at the creation of the
trust" adds "and, although the trust does not take effect until the testator's death, it is very plain that it is created and exists under and by
virtue of the will." A palpable evasion. It is created under, it does
exist by virtue of the will. Who could contest this? But is it "created'" when, as soon as, the will is written? Are not other thing.s
besides the will, necessary to its creation? e.g., the survival of the devisee? The death of the devisor? The continuance of the same testamentary intention between the writing of the will and the death?
In Quin's Estate, the will was written 14 years before the writer's
death. Did the daughter's estate exist during those years? If not,
something else had to occur to bring it into existence; to "create"
it.
But why entangle ourselves in a word? Is there any sensible
policy of law that forbids the "creation" of a sole and separate use before the marriage of the ferne, if no estate actually vests in that feme
until she is married, and if, therefore, there is no actual divorce between having an estate, and having a power to alienate it, except during and on account of coverture?
Clark J. invokes another principle. If a man is insane when he
writes a will, the will does not become valid by his subsequent recovery of sanity. If when the will is written, the law requires a will to
be executed in a certain way, to which law, its execution does not conform, a subsequent change in the law whereby a will executed as this
was, would be valid, does not retroact upon this and make it valid.
WNTith the best intentions, it is really difficult to realize the force of
this reasoning. The will before the court was not defective by reason of subjective incapacity of the writer; nor because the testamentary intention was not expressed in the legal mode, but if at all, because the estate, intended to come into existence, was intended to
have certain qualities, which it might lawfully have, if a new fact
should when it came into existence, have occurred, viz, marriage, but
which it could not lawfully have, unless this new fact had come into
existence. The testator was not attempting to create a sole and separate use for an unmarried person, but a sole and separate use, in
case, at the going into operation of the estate, the devisee should be
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a married person. It would be a palpable petito princpi to argue
that it is illegal to provide,in advance of death, by will, for an estate
which, if the devisee shall then be covert, shall be affected with inalienability, and therefore that this will is illegal. The very question
is, does the law forbid the arranging by will for an estate which, if the
intended devisee shall become covert, shall be charged with a sole
and separate use. If it does, then, of course, the separate use in
Quin's Estate was void. But, .t will never do to attempt to prove
that the law does forbid such an arrangement by means of the as.R'
tion that the law forbids such an arrangement. It is hardly short ot
absurd to say, that because the law makes void a sole and separate
use, attached to an estate when there is no coverture, therefore it
makes void a testamentary provision for an estate with a sole and
separate use, when there 'shall be a coverture, if the coverture does
not already exist when the will is written.
When a statute says a will must be executed thus and thus, a
subsequent change or repeal of the statute does not affect wills theretofore made which, in their mode of execution, did not conform to
the then existing law, but, would have conformed to the later law
When the law requires a will to be the expression of a sane intention,
an insane man's will does not become the expression of a sane intention, by reason of his later becoming sane. But when a man writes
that at his death, he wants his daughter, if then covert,to hold her devise free from marital control, he offends no rule that had been propounded in Pennsylvania prior ro Neale's Appeal.
Is it suggested that the testator did not in that case and in
Quin's Estate, provide for a sole and separate use, on condition that
the daughter should be married when the will went into effect? The
answer is, that the condition may be easily and sensibly implied. If
he knew the law, he must have meant it, and we are assured in Quin's
Estate that he must be presumed to have known the law. If he
knew that a sole and separate use is a use against a husband, he
knew that the condition of its becoming operative, was that there
should be a husband. He knew that there was, as yet, no husband.
Of course he created the use for a future. marriage, and if that marriage occurred before his own death, so that there was no time during which the estate was in the daughter, while she was discovert,
why should the testamentary arrangement be declared void in deference to a schoolman's logic, playing on phrases?,
In Neale's Appeal, the testator bequeathed property to his daughter and his granddaughter, "for their sole and separate use and which
shall not be controlled etc by * * * any future husband of my said
granddaughter." The language of the will in Quin's Estate is "And,
in case of the marriage of my said daughter Mary, then * * * the
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same (income) shall not in any wise be subject to the control of their
respective husbands" (i e.) of the two daughters. The provision is
expressly conditioned on a future marriage.
The doctrine of the cases then is, that if a testator devises anything to a daughter, unmarried when the will is executed, and provirles that she shall if she gets married, bold it subject to a sole and
separate use, the provision of the use is utterly void, and for this doctrine, not a shred of tolerable reasoning is tendered.
Clarke J., in Quin's Estate, apologetically remarks, "If it is believed that the law should be otherwise, the appeal should be to the
legislature. The rules prevailing in this state in reference to sepaate uses have become rules of property." But who made them? The
power that made viz, the court, can unmake them. The "rule"
specially referred to was made in 1883, and it annulled the will of 'a
testator. Only eight years elapsed, before Clark J. dignified it with
the name of a "rule of property," that is, one decision, poorly considered, and feebly defended by reasons, makes a rule of property,
which, eight years after, when the next case, presenting the same
question arises, has become so far inviolable, that the courts can furnish no escape from it! There have been other rules of property consecrated by longer recognitions, which the courts of Pennsylvania
have found a way to overthrow'. If in 189T they had lost the art of
destroying a pernicious and indefensible rule, only eight years old,
of their own invention, it is devoutly to be hoped that they have since
recovered it.
We have not adverted to the Act of June 4th, 1879, which enacts
that "every will shall be construed, with reference to the real estate
and personal estate comprised in it, to speak and take effect as if it
had been executed immediately before the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will." In Neale's Appeal
the will was written eight years before the passage of this act. It is
intimated however, that even if applicable to the will, the act refers
simply to the property intended by the testator to pass, and not to
the estate therein. It was not the intention of the act, says Mercur,
C. J., to create a disposing power, just before the testator's death,
which he did not possess, when he wrote it. At common law, a man
could not dispose of that which he had not, and, therefore he could
not dispose by will, of that which he did not acquire until subsequentCf. MacConnell v. Lindsay, 131 Pa. 476 MacConnell v. Wright 150
Pa. 275. In 1855 it was decided that land held to the sole and separate use

was alienable. Haines v. Ellis, 24 Pa. 253 and in 1863 the contrary was de-

cided; Wright v. Brown, 44 Pa. 224.

What became of the rule of property?
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ly'. The act of 1879 was intended either to give him a power to dispose at the making of the will of that which he previously could not
dispose of, or to compel the courts to treat the will, considered as a
disposition of property, as a disposition made at death. It would not
be doing violence to this act to regard it, as it makes a disposition of
property of which the testator could not dispose at its writing, valid
if he could have disposed of it at death; as also making modes of disposition of this property valid that would not have been so at the
writing; if they would have been valid if made at the death. But if
this interpretation is too liberal and the act of 1879 has no effect upon
the question we have been discussing, enough has been said to suggest the need of a retraction of the preposterous doctrine of the cases

criticized.

PRAETOR.

MOOT COURT
XENIA BANK vs. WM. ABSALOM.
Negotiable Instrument Act of May 16, 1901, Sections 139-140 Construed-Qualified Acceptance.
STATEMENT

OF THE CASE.

Absalom drew a draft on Bolton addressed to him at Philadelphia to
the order of Cox for $5000. Cox took the draft to Dolton who wrote across
the face "accepted payable at the Chemical National Bank, New York." Cox
.then had the draft discounted by the Xenia Bank and the proceeds thereof
credited to his account. At its maturity, the draft was duly protested for
non-payment and the notice of protest duly served on Absalom and Cox.
The Xenia Bank brings an action of assumpsit on the draft against Absalom.
Johnson for the plaintiff
The drawer remains at all times the principal debtor on the bill. Norton on Bills and Notes, p. 79. The holder or owner of a negotiable note
does net discharge the drawer. White v. Hopkins, 3 W. & S. 99; Swope v.
Ross, 4 Pa. 186; Walker vs. Bank, 2 S. & R. 3 8 2.
Davies for the defendant.
An undertaking by the drawee of a bill to pay it at a different town
from that at which the bill is addressed to him constitutes a qualified acceptance. Walker v. Bank, 13 Barb. 663; Niagara Dist. Bank v. Fairman
&c Co., 31 Barb. 403.
An acceptance varying from the tenor of the instrument as to time,
amount, mode or place of payment is a qualified acceptance.
Am. & Eng. Ency. Vol. 4, p. 224; Norton on Bills & Notes, p. 82.
See Girard v. Philadelphia, 2 Wall. Jr. 305, quoted in Quin's Estate 144
Pa. 444. "A will is in the nature of a conveyance or an appointment of .a
particular estate; and consequently, the testator mits t have the piower to
dispose at the time the wilt is e.xecuted.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.
in this case seems to be whether the words
question
-The
LAUB, J.:
"'ace-Ate., payable at the Chemical National Bank, N. Y." constitute such a
general acceptance, under the Act of May 16, 1901, P. L. 203, that the plaintiff bank can maintain this action against the drawer, Absalom. If this be
a qualified acceptance, then under section 142, of the Act of May 16, 1901,
P. L. 213, the drawer and indorsers are discharged from liability on the
bill, unless they have expressly or impliedly authorized the holder to take
a qualified acceptance, or subsequently assent thereto. Were it not for the
words of the said act of May 16, 1901, we should have no hesitation in sayIng that the acceptance was qualified, since an acceptance varying from the
tenor of the instrument as to time, is generally called a qualified acceptance: Am. & Eng Encyclopedia of Law, vol. 13, 595. There are cases takto
the drawee of a bill
ing the position that an uidertaking by
pay It at a different town from that at which the bill is addressed to him,
constitutes a qualified acceptance: Walker v. State Bank, 13 Barb. (N. Y.)
636; Niagara District Bank v. Fairmai, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 403. Myers v.
Standart, 11 Ohio State 39 In Bridge v Livingston, 11 Ia. 57, it was held
that a qualified or conditional acceptance must have the assent of all
the antecedent parties-the drawer and the indorsers-in order to be bindIng upon them, and in the absence of such assent they are released from I1obility on their undertaking. A purchaser or holder must also know, at his
reril, what is necessary to constitute an acceptance or an indorsement; Mercantile National Bank v. Lauth, 143 Pa. 62.
It is true that Bolton by accepting the draft in the manner he did
made it a foreign bill. For if the drawer and drawee of a bill reside in
Pennsylvania, and the bill is payable in New York it is foreign: Pierce v.
Struthers, 27 Pa. 247.
In spite of*the authorities above cited we do not think that the'words
"accepted, payable at the Chemical Bank, N. Y.," constitute a qualified acceptance under the act of May 16, 1901, P. L. 203. Let us now consider the
sections of that act in reference to the matter of acceptance.
Section 139 of said act, P. L. 213 says, "An acceptance is either general or qualified. A general acceptance assents, without qualification, to
the order of the drawer. A qualified acceptance in express terms, varies
the effect of the bill as drawn." Were this section all that was said upon
the subject of acceptance, we should unhesitatingly say that the acceptance in question is a qualified acceptance, as in express terms it varies the
effect of the bill as drawn.
However, section 140 of said act, P. L. 213 says "An acceptance to pay
at a particular place is a general acceptance, unless it expressly states that
the bill is to be paid there only, and not elsewhere." Applying this section to the case in hand we find an acceptance to pay at a particular place,
viz: the Chemical National Bank, N. Y.; but we do not find that the acceptance expressly states that the bill is to be paid only at the Chemical
Bank, N. Y., and not elsewhere. Indeed Cox the payee did not g9t it discounted at the aforesaid bank but at the plaintiff bank, which probably was
a Philadelphia bank.
The act divides quallified acceptance into five parts, the third of which,
is "Local: that is to say, an acceptance to pay only at a particular place."
Here again we find the word "only" used, thus making it seem to be necessary to constitute a qualified acceptance that the acceptance should have
read "accepted, payable only at the Chemical National Bank, N. Y." We
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think that the view of the acceptance taken in this case, viz.: that it is a
general acceptance, accords with the intention of the legislature in passing
the act of May 16, 1901, P. L. 203, which intention seems as far as possible
to remove the clogs and impediments hindering the freedom of circulation
of negotiable instruments. Since this is a general acceptance, the drawer
Absalom is liable on the draft when not paid at maturity, and the plaintiff
bank as a holder for value can maintain this action against him.
OPINION

OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The acceptance by
The draft was addressed to B "at Philadelphia."
him was qualified by his undertaking to pay at the Chemical National Bank.
N.Y.
In England such a change of place of payment would have discharged
It
the drawer, unless on being promptly informed of it, he assented to it.
was held that the acceptor would not be liable, unless presentment was
made at the place named by him. Rowe v. Young, 2 Brod. & Bing. 165, 1
Daniel, 513. The act of Parliment, known as Sergeant Onslow's act, provided that such an acceptance, i. e., one naming a place of payment other
than that expressed or implied in the bill itself, should be deemed a general
acceptance unless expressed to be payable there "only and not otherwise
or elsewhere;" 1 Daniel, 515, 516, 613; The act was intended to affect the
liability of the acceptor; i. e. to make him suable, notwithstanding that demand had not been made for payment, at the place named by him, unless ne
had named that as the only place where it should be made. It did not affect the liability .of a drawer or indorser. 1 Daniel, 613.
The drawer or indorser was dis-charged, if the holder, without his assent acquiescingly received an acceptance payable at some other town than
that named in the bill. And this was the result in the American States,
"Thus, says Daniel, 1 Vol. 513, "if the bill be addressed to the drawees at
their place of residence, and it is accepted, payable at a different town, it is
a material variation if the holder receives it, and does not protest for nonacceptance; but a oill addressed generally to the drawee, in a city, may
be accepted, payable at a particular bank in the city." Troy City Bank v.
Lauman, 19 N. Y. 477; Meyers v. Standart, 11 Oh. St. 29; Niagara Bank v.
Fairman Co. 31, Barb 403.
It does not appear that the bill in this case, was such that presentment
of it for acceptance was necessary, in order to hold the drawer. Negot.
Inst. Act Art. XII. Presentment of bills etc. But the presentment having
been made, it was necessary for the holder to treat it as dishonored, and to
give timely notice of the dishonor, to the drawer, if he desired to hold the
latter. A qualified acceptance must be treated by the holder as no acceptance, Ls far as concerns the drawer, unless the latter assents to it on
prompt notice. There was no such notice in this case. The only question
before us, then, is whether the acceptance is to be regarded as qualified.
The authorities cited show that it was so regarded, prior to the enactment of the Negot. Inst. Law. That law declares that "An acceptance to
pay at a particular place is a general acceptance, unless it expressly states
that the bill is to be paid there only and not elsewhere." This was evidently suggestetd by Sergeants Onslow's Act. The Negot. Inst. Act defines a
der of the drawer," but then adds that "an acceptance to pay at a particugeneral acceptance, as one which "assents without qualification to the orlar place is a general acceptance" unless "etc. In brief it prevents a certain interpretation of the words of the acceptance. If the acceptance says

THE FORUM
payable "only" at a certain place, it will be understood to be so payable, but
If It says "payable at a certain place" it must be understood to mean that
the acceptor, nevertheless agrees to pay at the place named In the bill.
The added words have only the effect of indicating an alternative place.
It has been suggested that the Neg. Inst. Act. by a "particular place"
means a definite place within the area of the town or city at which the bill
Is by its terms to be paid, and that it does not apply to a case in which a
town or city is named by the acceptor, which is different from that named
In the bill. On reflection, we have not been able to accept this view. We
are not convinced that the acceptor's naming a particular spot in a city or
town for payment, is not enough to make the spot named, the spot at which
demand for payment would need to be made, in order to hold the drawer.
The drawer would give an implied authority to the drawee to designate such
a spot. But there is no implied authority, given to him to name a different
place. The object of the Negot. Inst. Act seems to be to prevent the nomination of a different town or city from impairing the liability of the drawer, unless this town or city Is made the sole place of payment.
Judgment affirmed.

BOLLINGER'S ESTATE.

Mortgage-Equity of Redemption-Merger-Preference
tors.

of Execution Credi-

STATEMENT OF THE -CASE.
A holds a first mortgage on Bollinger's land, B and C hold judgments
against Bollinger's land after the lien of the mortgage attached. Bollinger
becomes very sick and A in -order to save cost of foreclosure secures a deed
from him and records the deed. A's mortgage remains unsatisfied. B anI
C issue executions, levy upon and advertise this land for public sale. A issues a sci. fa., obtains judgment, issues execution and sells the land. The
proceeds are undergoing distribution. A and the judgment creditors claim
in opposition to each other. The plaintiff is A.
Stuart for the plaintiff.
The entering of any judgment for some debt secured by a mortgage
shall not cause a sheriff's sale of the mortgaged premises to destroy or In
any way effect the lien of such mortgage, nor shall the plaintiff in such
judgment be entitled to any part of the proceeds of such sale. P. & L. Dig.
1583; Com. v. Wilson, 34 Pa. 63; McCall v. Lenox, 9 S. & R. 304; Pierce v.
Potter, 7 Watts, 475.
Lewis for the defendant.
Plaintiff has a right to issue sci. fa., have execution issued and can give
good title to his purchaser. Moore v. Harrisburg Bank, 8 W. 138; Dougherty v. Jack, 5 W. 456; Pennington v. Coats, 6 Whart. 282.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
TOBIN, J.:-This Is a short and simple case, addressing itself to the
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common sense and common justice of the plainest man, and seems to require
no legal learning to decide it. We now proceed to the great question on
which the cause must depend. Does the union of the two interests in the
mortgage cause a merger? In law a merger always takes place when a
greater estate and a less coincide and meet in one and the same person, in
one and the same right without any intermediate estate. The lesser Is annihilated or merged at law In the greater. Furthermore, to effect a merger
at law, the right previously held, and the right subsequently acquired must
coalesce in the same person and in the same right without any other right
Intervening. But upon this subject says Sir William Grant in Forbes vs.
Moffat, 18 Yes. 390 "a court of equity is not guided by the rules of law. It
will sometimes hold a charge extinguished, where it would subsist at law;
and sometimes preserve it, where, at law it would be merged. It is also very
clear that a person becoming entitled to an estate subject to a charge for his
own benefit may if he chooses, at once take the estate and keep up the
charge. The question in such a case, is upon the intention actual or presimed, of the person in whom the estates are united. In most instances it is
with reference to the party himself, of no sort of use to have a charge on his
own estate, and when that Is the case it will be on foot." And in conformitv
to this doctrine, he held in that case that a mortgage was not merged or extinguished by becoming united in the same person with the fee, because I
was to be presumed that such was the intention of the party from the greater advantage being against merger in favor of the personal representatives,
It not appearing from the acts or declarations of the party what his actual
Intention was in regard to it. Moore vs. Harrisburg Bank, 8 Watts, 138;
But in the case under consideration
Helmbold vs. Mann, 4 Wharton, 409.
there is no room nor occasion to presume what the Intention of the parties
was; because it was Impliedly agreed and avowed that it should not sink
but be kept on foot for the purpose of Indemnifying the mortgagee against
subsequent encumbrances existing against the estate, and to avoid the expenses of foreclosure by taking or accepting the deed conveying to him the
fee In It. Hence this case does not rest on the mere presumption which
would doubtless also be sufficient to prevent merger of the mortgage, but is
much stronger against It than the case of Forbes vs. Moffat, supra. It was
said with much emphasis in Moore vs. Harrisburg Bank, supra, by Justice
Kennedy that, "a mortgage does not necessarily merge or become extinct by
being united In the same person with the fee; It may be kept alive where
such Is the Intention of the holder or the intention or agreement of the parties or where It would be for the holder's interest or advantage that the lien
should be preserved; In the latter case his intention to keep the mortgage
alive will be presumed; merger being largely a question of intention, where
there is the intention, actual or presumed of the person in whom the mortgage and fee unite that there shall be a merger, equity will not hold the
mortgage extinguished." We believe this to be the law as established by the
courts of Pennsylvania. To hold otherwise would result in wrong and Injustice or obscurity and confusion.
Therefore, when it was the intention of the parties that the mortgage
should not merge but continue to subsist for the protection of the owner of
the fee from subsequent Incumbrances he may keep it on foot, sue out a scire
faclas upon It In the name of the mortgagee against the mortgagor, with
notice to himself, obtain a judgment and sell the estate mortgaged. 12 P. &
L. Dig., 20878. The act of April 16, 1845, P. & L. Dig. 1583, does not per-
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mit the entry of judgment by judgment creditors to affect the lien of the
mortgage Moreover, the aut of Mar. 22, 1887, P. & L. Dig. 1585, prevents the
lien oZ a prior mortgage from being discharged by any judicial sale. The
other acts of assembly pertaining to mortgages are merely declaratory of the
existing law. Justice Rcad in Commonwalth vs. Wilson 34 Pa. 63 clearly
stated the trub rule in regard to these acts. It being thus seen to be for tha
advantage of the plaintiff that his mortgage should be kept on foot, we must
therefore pr',scme thai le intended it to be so.
We hereby direct that judgment be given in favor of the plaintiff for the
amount of his lien out of the proceeds- undergoing distribution.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
On Bollinger's land, were three liens, viz. (1) A's mortgage;
(2) B's
judgment;
(3) C's judgment. Suibsequently the equity of redemption is
conveyed by Bollinger to the mortgagee, A. Subsequently, judgment is obtained in a scl. fa. upon the mortgage, an execution is issued, and at the sheriff's sale thereon, the proceeds, now undergoing distribution are realized.
The dispute between A, on one hand, and B and C on the other, is whether A
as mortgagee shall be paid from the money, in preference to B and C.
As between Bollinger and A, the judgment upon the sci. fa. is conclusive
that the mortgage was a subsisting security. The estate of Bollinger has
been sold. It must be regarded as sold, even as against the judgment creditors. They could not treat the sale as void, and sell it again. As to them,
as well as to the mortgagee, the fund must represent the land.
If the purchase by A of the equity of redemption, caused his mortgage to
merge in the fee, the judgment became the first lien, and would be entitled
to be paid. Ordinarily, a merger results from the union of the ownership of
the mortgage and of the land, in the same person. It will not result however,
if for any reason, it will be to his advantage that it shall not. If it has not
been merged, A will now be paid. If it has merged, he will not. It is clearly beneficial to him, therefore that it is deemed not to have merged. Moore
v. Harrisburg Bank, 8 W. 138.
It follows that the mortgage must be first paid.
The residue of the pro
ceeds will be applied to the judgments in the order of their ages.
Judgment affirmed.

HARPER'S

ESTATE.

Ejectment-Wills-Fee Upon Conditional Limitation-Sheriff's Sale.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Josiah Harper by will gave to his wife. her heirs and assigns "his dwelting house." He added "but should it not be necessary to sell this house in
order to secure a support for my wife, my desire is that it go to my brother
Henry and his heirs." The wife survived for six years and borrowed $2000
upon a mortgage on the house, which money she used in her own support.
After her death the mortgagor foreclcsed the mortgage and caused a sheriffs
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sale. This is Ejectment between the purchaser and Henry Harper.
Earner for the plaintiff.
A devise of a fte when followed by a condition even to the extent or
prohibition against disposing it, the conditions are void. Boyle v. Boyle, 152
Pa. 108; Kaufman v. Burgert, 195 Pa. 274.
The power to sell, no matter how that power is obtained, implies a power to mortgage. Duval's Appeal, 38 Pa. 118; Zane v. Kennedy, 73 Pa. 192.
McAlee for the defendant.
In a devise of this kind the presumption is always against conversion
and when it is required it must be kept within the limits of actual necessity. Yerkes v. Yerkes, 200 Pa. 419.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
PARK, J.:-The words used by Josiah Harper in his will gave o his wife
a fee in the property now in contenion, but this fee was followed by a condition in another clause of the will. The first questioii which we will consider
is whether or not this condition defeated or limited the fee. In Hardaker's
estate 204 Pa. 181 the rule is laid down by the court that where an estate is
given to a person with a power of disposition it carries with it a fee, this is
expressed in clear and decisive words.
Now do the subsequent words "but should it not be necessary to sell this
house in order to secure a support for my wife, my desire is that it go to my
brother and his heirs", effect this fee? We think that it dpes not, and in
support of this conclusion we quote from the opinion of the court in Re est.
of Hugh Bellas 176 Pa. 122 where the court said "Where simply a desire is
expressed subsequent to the devise it is inoperative." In view of these cases and the law as laid down In Lininger's Appeal 110 Pa. 398, aitd Cox vs.
Rogers 77 Pa. 160 we conclude that the widow of Josiah Harper took a fee by
the will, and that this fee was not effected by the subsequent desire. If she
had a fee she certainly had an unrestricted right to sell. The will gave her
the right to sell for her support. She did not sell but mortgaged the property for her support, Now can the mortgagee foreclose and does the purchaser
at the sheriff's sale take a good title? A mortgage is a conditional sale.Lancaster v. Dolan 1 Rawle 248. There can be no doubt but that if she had
a fee, which we think she did, she then had the power of sale, and as it has
been held in Zane v. Kennedy 73 Pa. 192 and Duval's Appeal 38 Pa. 118 that
an absolute and unrestricted power to sell, includes a power to mortgage we
conclude that the widow took a fee, that this fee was not effected by the subsequent limitations, and that she had the right to mortgage for her support.
Judgment is therefore given for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
If the gift of the house to the testator's widow was an unqualified fee.
she of course could mortgage it, and the sale upon the mortgage would pass
the ownership in tee over to the purchaser. He should then recover in the
ejectment.
If the gift was of a fee, with the condition that, if the house should not
necessarily be expended, in securing a support for the widow, them it should
pass on her death to Henry Harper, i. e. if the gift to the widow was of a. fee
followed by conditional limitation; the purchaser at the mortgage sale should
again, recover. We take it that the widow was to decide on the necessity of
a' sale, in order to secure a support. She In making the mortgage, has expressed the decision that she needed $2000 for her support. The mortgage
was a form of sale, in order to raise this sum. The condition, therefore, on
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which the limitation over to Henry was dependent, has not been realized. The
fee has passed to the purchaser.
If we regarded the phrase concerning sale, etc., as showing that only a
life estate was given to the widow, plus a power, if necessary to sell that estate and the remainder, the power to sell would Include the power to mortgage, the mortgage would bind the remainder, the remainder would have bebecome, by the mortgage-sale, the property of the purchaser.
Prom whatever point of view we regard the transaction, the plaintiff is
entitled to the land. Henry Harpei has nothing in it. There is nothing in
Dickinscrn's Estate, 209 Pa. 59 inconsistent with this conclusion.
Judgment affirmed.

J. THOMPSON VS. BOROUGH

OF CARLISLE.

Adverse Possession-Adverse User-Dedication.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Thompson owned a lot facing on A street. He erected on it a house,
setting the front 4 feet back of the building line. Over this space, he projected from the house a bay window, which did descend within 4 feet of the
ground. After 30 years, during which the public used the 4 feet as the rest
of the sidewalk, the Borough widened the street so as to make it embrace
these 4 feet. This is an action of trespass to recover damages from the
Borough for taking these 4 feet.
Hicks for the plaintiff.
Where a landowner sets back the fence along a public highway andleaves an open space for his own convenience, it is not a dedication to the
public, although the space is used by the public jointly with the owner and
with his sufferance. Griffin's Appeal, 109 Pa. 150; Weiss v. So. Bethlehem
Boro. 136 Pa. 294.
Paved spaces left open on private property, for the accomodation of the
owner and used by the public as passageways, are not thereby dedicated to
the public use, but may be closed at pleasure. Gowen v. Phila. Exchange
C. 5 W. & S. 141, Bush v. Johnson, 23 Pa. 209.
Sorber for the defendant.
The use of ground by the public as a highway for over 21 years makes
it a public road as effectively as though it was originally laid out and opened by the proper authorities. Com. v. Cole, 26 Pa. 127; Donohue v. Lister,
205 Pa. 464.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BRADDOCK, J.:-In this case the Borough sets up the user by the public of a four foot strip of ground in front of plaintiff's bay window and in front
of his house for a period of a0 years alleging that this user establishes it
as a public way. Permission to the public to use the way without intention to
yield. the right to use-Jt, even continued for 21 years or more does not alone
make a dedication. Griffin's Appeal, 109 Pa. 150; Weiss v. So. Bethlehem
Borough, 136 Pa. 294.
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A space left open in private property bordering on a highway for the accommodation of the owner and not of the public, may be resumed at pleasure. Gowen vs. Philadelphia Exchange Co., 5 NV. & S. 141.
The mere setting back of a building from the line of a street is not a dedication of the intervening space to public use. Neill v. Gallagher, 31 Legal
Int. 388.
In view of the foregoing cases the Court is of the opinion that the retiring of the front of the building, except the bay window, four feet from the
pavement, coupled with the fact that as the plaintiff desired a bay-window
over 28 inches deep he was compelled to set the house back from the street
line, (Pages 53 Borough Ordinances of Carlisle, Section 6, 1853) is not evidence of an intention to dedicate to the public.
The Borough can not force him back and then take his land because ne
obeyed.
Judgment for plaintiff, for the amount the viewers awarded.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The house of Thompson was set back 4 feet from the building line. This
was probably in part done in order that a bay window might be projected
A bay window was in fact built, and
without trenching upon the sidewalk.
On
these
feet of
the
ground.
to within
four
descended
to the public of
of a
dedication
there
Is
no indication
facts,
of
the
between
the
facade
feet
wide
strip
the
4
house and the inner line of the sidewalk. Thompson had a purpose of his
own to subserve which fully explains his acts. He will not under such circumstances, be supposed to have Intended to give and to have given the strip
Griffin's Appeal, 109 Pa. 150: Gowen v. Phila. Exchange Co., 5 W. &
away.
S. 141; Neill v. Gallagher 31, L. Int. 388; Weiss v. Borough of South Bethlehem, 136 Pa. 294. The mere fact that 30 years have elapsed since this setting
back of the house occurred, will not convert it into a dedication. If a gift to
the public was not then Intended, such intention cannot be inferred because
tlme has fled since the acts were done.
During these 30 years, the public has been using the strip of four feet, as
the rest of the side-walk. They have walked within, as well as without It.
But how, from this tolerated use, can an inference of dedication be made?
That use was entirely consistent with the use to which he intended to put.
and actually put, the land. To have quarrelled with every pedestrian, man,
woman or child, that did not keep strictly without the official building line,
would have been preposterous.
As a dedication cannot be deduced from the acts of Thompson and the
acts of the public tolerated by him, neither can It be said that the public have
acquired a right to the 4 feet wide strip, by adverse user. When the toleration of this use is explicable by other motives than the opinion of feeling that
the public had a right to make It and when this use on the part of the
public is explicable by other reasons than the belief of the people who used
the strip, that they had a right to use it. Whether THompson willed it or
not, it Is impossible to affirm that a right has been acquired by the public.
The case is unlike Donohugh v. Lister, 205 Pa. 464.
It follows that, when the borough widened the street by incorporating into It a strip of 4 feet along the side, It was under a duty to compensate the
land owners, Including Thompson.
Judgmeut Affirmed.
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JOHN JONES VS. WM. SMITH.

Mutual Accounts-Statute of Limitations-Merchants" Accounts.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
John Jones is a dealer in farming implements. Win. Smith is carrying
on the business of farming. They enter into an agreement, namely: John
Jones is to furnish implements, etc., to Win. Smith, and he in return is to
furnish plaintiff with hay, corn, oats, etc., and whenever an accounting is
demanded by either one, each is to furnish an account and pay any balance
thus shown to be due the other. Six years have passed since the date of the
last item on the book of John Jones, but only five years have passed since
Jones first demanded the rendering of an account.
This is assumpsit by Jones for $500.00.
Ehler for the plaintiff.
Where defendant, a farmer and shoemaker furnished hides, bark and
grain to the plaintiff a tanner who furnished leather to the defendant they
were held merchants' account within the exception to the Act of Mar. 27,
1713. Chambers v. Marks, 25 Pa. 296.
, The statute makes an exception in these cases and provides no time
within which the action must be brought. The courts hold that in merchants" accounts the'statute runs only from the time of an account stated.
Bevan vs. Cullen, 7 Pa. 281; Hamilton v. Hamilton, 18 Pa. 20.
Tyler for tho defendant
When there are mutual, current and unsettled dealings and accounts
between the parties the items of credit and charge in such accounts, within
six years before the commencement of the action are deemed equivalent to
a subsequent promise reviving the debt. Thomas v. Hoffer, 1 W. & S. 467;
Chambers v. Marks, 25 Pa. 296.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
RENO, J.:-The point rai'sed by the' statement of the case has involved
us in an investigation of the language and construction of the Act of March
27, 1713 known more familiarly as the Statute of Limitations. The portion
relevant to this case provides that, "All actions upon account and upon the
case, other than such accounts as concern the trade of merchandise between
merchant and merchant, their factors and agents" shall be commenced or
sued within six years after the cause of action or suit accrues and not after.
1 M. L. 76 Sec. I., P. & L. Dig.'2667. Tne language of the English statute
upon the same subject is identical, but the Pennsylvania Courts have departed so widely from the English construction that nothing can be gained by a
Not entirely satisfied with
consideration of the transatlantic authorities.
the statute, our Courts have apparently judicially legislated and engrafted
new provisions upon the product of the General Assembly. Thus, due to some
extent to the action of the Courts, we are permitted to speak of "mutpal" and
"merchants" accounts. The latter are indeed recognized by the Act, thought
it failed to recognize or prescribe any limitation for actions on them. Hence
the courts inVented one, and now an action is barred even on a merchant's
accounts, properly called, six years after an account is"stated" as distinguished from "open"; Bevan v. Cullen, 7 Pa. 281; or at least after a demand there-
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for is made. Jane v. Mickey, 55 Pa. 310. Mutual accounts are nowhere
mentioned in the Act, and although they are said to be exceptions resting
within the statute, this seems doubful. In mutual accounts, the remedy is
barred six years after the date of the last item, irrespective of whether that
item appears on the books of the paintiff or defendant. Thomas v. Hopper
30 W. & S. 467; Chambers v. Marks 25 Pa. 296. The distinction between the
two species of accounts then, is: The remedy on a merchants's account is
barred six years after a demand for an account stated, while a mutual account
will not sustain an action if the last item is beyond the six year period.
In the case at bar, six years have passed since the last item. Therefore,
if it be a mutual account the action is barred. But only five years have passed since there was a demand for an account stated. If it is a merchant's
account, then there is still an enforceable right of action.
We are convinced that this is not a merchant's account. One is a vendor
of farming implements-the other Is a farmer. The plaintiff will pass as a
merchant , but neither reason nor authority dictate that a farmer is such.
The law has always acknowledged a distinction between the trading and the
agricultural class and it would be too late now to attempt to give the one
the privileges belonging to another, especially on the ground that both
are one. Neither is the account between the merchant and his factor or his
agents. Hence the provision will not apply and the account is mutual. Having arrived at this conclusion it is but a step to decide that as the last item
Is of a date beyond six years ago, the remedy is barred and we must enter.
Judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME ')OURT.
ne of the important facts
The cpinion of the learned court below ignc"
eginning of their reciprocal
established by the evidence. The parties at t
dealings, made an agreement each to furnish the other, from time to time, articles within his line, and postponing payment for these articles until either
should express his desire to -terminate the reciprocal dealings by demanding
an account. The sum then to be paid was not the sum of the prices furnished
by either to the other, but the difference between the sum of the prices of
goods furnished by the plaintiff, and the sum of the prices of goods furnished
by the defendant. The parties had a right to make such an agreement, and
the courts must respect it.
The statute of limitations begins to run, when a right of action begins.
Neither of the parties was in default, neither had a right of action against
the other, until he demanded of, or presented to the other an account and demanded the difference. A bank which receives deposits, instantly becomes a
debtor to the depositor, but it is bound to pay only on demand,and the statu'tory period of six years begins only with the demand. That period begins
with respect to a check marked "good" only with its presentment to the bank
for payment. A subscription to stocl in a corporation payable on demand or
call, becomes payable only on call, and the suit on it would be barred only
after the lapse of six years from the call.
It is not necssary to hold that the demand for an account in the case before us, might have been indefinitely postponed with the effect of preventing the operation of the limitation. Doubtless, on the cessation of dealings
for a considerable interval, the party eeeming himself the creditor or desiring to ascertain whether he was or not, shouid have demanded a settlement.
The verdict shows that not more than one year Intervened between the last
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credit on either side, and the demand by Jones for an account. In view of
the fact that there were, in the dealings of these parties,frequently intervals
of several months' duration, we cannot say that the delay of one year before
demanding an account and payment was too great.
The verdict finds that "six years have passed since the date of the last
item on the book of John Jones", but it does not find that there was no later
ilem of credit on the side of William Smith. The time for demanding an account must be ascertained by reference to the last item on either side, furnished by the party in pursuance of the initial contract.
Our conclusion may be thus expressed.
The parties agreed to furnish
each to the other, an indefinite number of articles, at intervals within an in
definite period of time. They agreed that the prices of these articles shoul-I
be payable not upon delivery nor at all; but that, on demand, at any time, a
balance should be struck, and the party found indebted should pay that bal.
ace. The obligation assumed was to pay that balance, and that obligation
matured, so that an action could be maintained upon it, not before a demand
for an account was made, or, should have been made. Probably this qualification should be eliminated, for the defendant might at any time have made
the demand, had he thought the plaintiff too tardy, or had he intended to terminate the contract for continuous and recriprocal sales.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

JOHN TURNER vs. WM. PAUL.

Slander-Words Actionable per se-Measure of Damages.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The uncle of Turner, who was disposed to bequeath $10,000 to him, and
for the persuasion of Paul would have done so, was dissuaded by Paul from
doing so, or making a will at all. The result was that Turner got only $2000
out of the estate. Paul was not pecuniarly benefited by the intestacy of the
deceased but having a grudge against Turner, for that reason poisoned the
decedent's mind by falsely accusing Turner of being a gambler and drunkard
and consorting with base females. This is trespass for $8000.
Stuart for the plaintiff.
Any words which tend to injure the reputation of plaintiff are cause
for action. Vanderlip v. Roe, 23 Pa. 82; Thompson v. Lush, 2 Watts 20:
Hays v. Brierly, 4 Watts 393; Stoke v. Miller, 8 Sadler (Pa.) 100; Wilton
v. Singleton 7 S. & R. 449.
The showing of malice on the part of the slanderer is sufficient to justify the imposition of punitive damages. Gray v. Pentland, 2 S. & R. 23:
Bruce v. Reed, 104 Pa. 408.
Sorber for the defendant.
In case of slander the damages recoverable must be the natural, direct,
proximate and necessary result of the defamatory words. Place v. Shippen,"
80 Pa. 513; Wallace v. Rodgers, 156 Pa. 395.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.
CAREY, 3.:-The facts of the case are briefly, as follows: Turner's uncle was dissuaded from leaving him $10,000 by Paul, who to satisfy a grudge
told the uncle, Turner was "a gambler, a drunkard, and a consorter with bast)
women." . This was false, but as a result the uncle left Turner only $2000.
'urner now sues for the difference vi2. $8000.
The questions are (1) Are the words gambler, drunkard, and consort
with base women, actionable, per se (2) What is the measure of damages
in this case.
The cases hold that the word "Drunkard" is not actionable per se.unles.;
It is coupled with some business in which drunkeness is a disqualification
39 Fed. Rep. 672; A. & E. Enyc. Vol. 13 p 377.
Whenever the statute makes an offence punishable by fine or imprisonment it is actionable per se. As to gambling, the statute holds a "common
gambler" to be person who engages for a living in gambling, or one who having no fixed place of residence is in the habit of gambling for a living. It is
true that Paul did not say Turner waa a "common" gambler, which is the
term used in the statute, yet we think that by innondo he is guilty of accusing Turner of an actionable offense. As words calcuated to induce the
hearer to believe that the person of whom they arc spoken is guilty of a
crime is sufficient.
The words "consorter with base females" we take to impute the crime.
by innuendo, of fornication, and as such they are actionable per se. 54 Conn.
4 26; 2 Conn. 707; 66 Barb. (N. Y.) 429; 2 Phila. 210.
Spoken words imputing a crime punishable with imprisonment are actionable without suecial damage being shown. We therefore hold that Turner can recover, but the amount is a question1 for the jury. Turner had no
vested right in his uncle's estate. His uncle might lose his money before
death. He could certainly leave it to whom he pleased. Turner himself
might not live to inherit. Certainly he had no more than a mere expectancy.
If his reputation or business is injure& to the extent of $8000 then this amount
should be awarded. Not because It is the difference between the amount received and the amount expected, but because he is injured to that extent. If
he is not injured in reputation or business to this extent then a less amount
should be awarded, which amount we leave for the jury to determine.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The action is for the loss occasioned by false words spoken to his uncle
about Turner.
He was accused by Paul, of being a gambler, drukard and
consorter with base females. The accusation was known by Paul to be false.
It was made in order to dissuade the uncle from bequeathing, (as he ihtended to do, and would have done,) $10,000 to Turner. The bequest was in consequence, not made, and the result was that instead of getting $10,000 from
his uncle's estate, Turner got, by the intestate law, but $2000.
The learned court below has discussed whether the charges imputed
crime, and for that reason, were actioiable per se. It is not a crime to be a
drunkard, nor to be a gambler, nor to consort with base women. Other facts
must be conjoined With these, in order to constitute a crime. But we thin:
the question irrelevant. The words were spoken in order to effect a definite
result, viz., the disherison, (or its equivalent) of Turner. The result was effected. We think the defendant for this reason is bound to indemnify the
plaintiff.
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Turner, it is true, had no right to the bequest of $10,600. He did not
have a right to the abstinence by Paul, from false representations, in order
to dissuade the decased uncle from making it. A iban has no right to inherit from his father, but a defamation which produces disherison is an actione]le slander, 1 Jaggard, Torts, 509. A merchant has no right that X, o
Y, or Z, shall deal with him, but he has a right that they shall not be induced
to refuse their trade, by false declarations of any one. If B by falsehood
prevents A's being invited to a friend's house for dinner, his words are actionable; 1 Jaggard, Torts, 489; Lynch v. Knight, 9 Fl. L. Cas. 599; Davies V.
Salomon, L. R. 72. B. 112. A, employed by B, but for no definite time, and
therefore dismissible at any time, has no right to be continued in the employment, but he has a right that his diamissal shall not be produced by false accusations of the defendant. Cf. Wallace v. Rodgers, 156 Pa. 395. If A wilt
perform a contract with B which, because of the statute of frauds, he is not
bound to perform, and C, by falsehood, induces him to repudiate it, B. will
have indemnification from C. Though he had no legal right that A should
perform, he had a right that A should not be dissuaded from performing b
C's false words.
It stificiently appears that the direct result of the defendant's words,
was ihe loss by plaintiff of $8000. This loss was in the contemplation o"
Paul. It was intended, because of a grudge. He Is guilty of a malicious an.d
purposed diversion of $8000 from Turner. He should therefore make the
latter whole. The case differs essentially from Marshall v. DeHaven, 20.)
Pa. 187.
Judgment reversed.

WM. J. JOLLINGS vs. AARON STEVENS.

Contingent Fees-Subornation of Perjury,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Stevens employed Jollings, attorney, to recover for him, a tract of land
worth $3,000 offering Jollings 1/ of its estimated value, $3,000, if he succeeded.
Jollings was to disover the grounds of recovery and find the' evidence. If
was not understood that any perjured evidence was to be obtained. Jolling.:
finding that the only way to recover w ould be to prove that Stevens's grantor was the heir of John Kilpatrick, employed four witnesses to perjure themselves in swearing that the grantor was the only son of John Kilpatrick, and
that John Kilpatrick was dead. The grantor, though named Kilpatrick was
not the son, neither was John Kilpatrick dead. The verdict and judgmeiit
in favor of Stevens, however were conclusive.
This is an action for the fees agreed upon.
Robertson for the plaintiff.
The law will not allow the principal to repudiate the fraud of his agents
and at the same time retain the fruits. Hughes v. Bank, 110 Pa. 128; WFeel-
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er & Wilson M'f'g Co. v. Aughley, lI.t Pa. 398; Reynolds v. Fenton. 2 Phila.
222.
Gardner for the defendant.
The principal is not liable for an act of his agent on the agent's own
behalf. Smith v. Ins. Co. 24 Pa. 321: Stewart v. Bremer 63 Pa. 268.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BOWMAN, J.:-From a perusal of the opinions of the Supreme Court in
the cases cited below, it appears that it has long been held that contingent
fees are not illegal in Pennsylvania. The last case cited would in itself be
sufficient to convince the court that this doctrine Is fully established: Miles v.
O'Hara, 1 S. & R., 32; Boulden v. Hebel, 17 S. & R., 312; Strohecker v. Hoffman, 7 Harris, 223; Chester Co. v. Barber, 1 Out., 463; Dickerson v. Pyle, 4
Phila, 259; Perry v. Dicken, 105 Pa., 83; Beatty v. Larzelere, 194 Pa., 605:
Williams v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa., 282.
The defendant refuses to pay to plaintiff the fee agreed upon in the contract.
It appears from the statement of facts that there was nothing illegal in
the contract; "that it was not understood that any perjured evidence was o
be obtained." The plaintiff, however, found that the only way to recover the
land and receive his fee would be to prove that Stevens's grantor was the
heir of John Kilpatrick. He employed four witnesses to perjure themselve'
in order to obtain a verdict. He obtained a verdict and judgment for his
client, Stevens.
Can it be said, as counsel for defendant urges, that the procuring of these
perjured witnesses invalidates the contract between the plaintiff and defendant, and relieves the defendant from paying the amount of this contingent
fee? We think it can not. In Perry v. Dicken, supra, the court said, "If it
appears that the contingent fee is a reward for his services as a witness.
this contention," that the atorney cannot recover, "would certainly be sustained; snch a contract would be not only reprehensible but highly immoral,
against public policy, and therefore, illegal and void." But in -our case it
does not appear that the fee was to be a reward for his services as a witness, nor does it appear that the fee was to be a reward for his services in
procuring perjured witnesses. The statement of facts shows the contrary:
that it was a reward for a conclusive verdict and judgment.
We think that the contract for the fee is valid and binding; that what
the attorney did in executing his part of the contract, howeverl immoral
and illegal, does not bar his right to recover the amount of his fee.
Notwithstanding our abhorrence of such practice as the plaintiff has used
in this case,-in obtaining these witnesses, we are constrained in deference
to the consideration before mentioned to render judgment in his favor.

Judgment affrmed.
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KELKER vs. GIMFORT.

Malicious Prosecution-Want of Probable Cause-Malice.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Gimfort, thinking Kelker had stolen his watch, on information of a
roommate of Kelker, had him prosecuted and tried and convicted. The
court granted a new trial and finally the Commonwealth entered a nolle
prosequi. Gimfort's watch had in fact been stolen, but he had found it
again. He had had a quarrel with Kelker and welcomed the accusation as
a means of punishing him. This is-an action for malicious prosecution.
Hassert for the plaintiff.
Henneke for the defendant.
The burden of proof lies on the. plaintiff to, show malice and want of
probable cause. If probable cause is shown it matters not whether the motive of the prosecutor was praiseworthy or malicious. Beihofer v Loeffert.
159 Pa. 374; Leahey v. March, 155 Pa. 458; Scott v. Dewey, 23 Super. 396.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
WOLFE, J.:-This actionof malicious prosecution was brought by Kelker against Gimfort because Gimfort had prosecuted Kelker on the criminal
charge of larceny based on the information of the roommate of Kelker. Malicious prosecution cannot be brought and sustained unless there are present
these elements: a termination of the prosecution; want of probable cause;
and malice. In the case at bar Kelker had been found guilty of the larceny of the watch but a new trial was granted and not given because the
Commonwealth had entered a nolle prosequi. That this was sufficient termination, is not doubted so we pass to the second element namely that of
want of probable cause.
The facts are undisputed soit is the duty of the coulrt to direct the jury
to find a verdict. "The question of direct cause is one of law for the court
where the facts relied on to constitute It are admitted or established beyond
controversy."
Hucksteln vs. N. Y. Life Insurance Co. 205 Pa. 27. Previous to the indictment for the larceny of the watch Gimfort and Kelker had quarrelled and
the former welcomed the accusation as a means of displaying his vindictiveness. This expose of unchristian feeling on the part of Gimfort seemed
to Kelker unwarrantable, unpardonable and Illegal so he institutes this civil
action.
If the facts show want of probable cause Glmfprt has over-leaped himself and has leaped from the proverbial trying pan into the fire, and Kelker can be doubly gleeful over this second humiliation of Glmfort. On Kelher lies the burden of proving the want of probable cause.
Scott vs. Dersey 23 Super. 396.
A crime, a felony has been committed here. The roommate of Kelker
Informed the loser of the watch that Kelker was the thief. On the trial
enough evidence was produced by the Commonwealth to sustain a verdict
of guilty on the Indictment of larceny. If a verdict of not guilty had been
Tendered, we would have been constrained to. doubt very seriously whether
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the information obtained from the roommate of the accused was such as to
induce an ordinary prudent man in believing Kelker guilty, and particularly
so in memory of the fact of the previous altercation between the parties to
this action. But twelve men were convinced of the reliability of the information, likewise the court, so we think that this information was sufficient
to sustain the prosecution. Moreover, there has not been shown on the rart of
the plaintiff that the roommate was in collusion with Gimfort, or even a
friend. Such testimony absent, the very reasonable inference is drawn that
at most the roommate was a disinterested person if not in fact a friend of the
accused. Roommates usually are congenial and friendly toward each other,
and seldom desirous of inflicting punishment on each other either directly
or indirectly. Nothing was shown by the plaintiff that would cause the defendant to have discredited the room-mate's communication because of the
source.
The plaintiff urges upon us the malice borne towards him by the defendant because of their quarrel. Even if that prompted the defendant to prosecute on the charge of larceny, the existence of malice at that time is strongly rebutted by the entering of the nolle prosequi before the second trial.
Larceny is a felony and not within that class of cases that can be withdrawn
before running the course of trial. It is not an exception within the Act of
Mar. 13, 1860, P. & L. 1410-1411. There might not have been a second conviction but Gimfort if he were so very vindictive could harass the plaintiff
by imposing on him the necessity of undergoing a second trial, and the
concurring expense, even though the watch had been found, as its reception
by the owner was no satisfaction of the public wrong committed. If that
were the case most crimes could be atoned for to the destruction of society.
In the absence of this apparent good-will on Gimfort's part in not Insisting
on the second trial, and in the presence of express malice on his part Kelker
could not urge this malice as a means of showing probable cause.
"Absence of probable cause is essential; from want of probable caus%
malice may be inferred; but from malice, even if express, want of probable
cause cannot be inferred."
Cleon vs. Gerry 13 Gray (Mass.) 201.
The former conviction of the plaintiff strengthens the opinion that Gimfort had facts within his knowledge sufficient to sway an ordinary, prudent
man to the belief that Kelker was the miscreant wno stole the watch.
"It is generally agreed that a conviction of a defendant in a criminal proceeding, though subsequently reversed, negatives the absence of probable
cause, unless it is made to appear that the conviction was procured by the
fraud of the instigator of the criminal proceeding."
Ames Cases on Torts p. 551, Vol. I (note).
It seems that the same principle applies in Pennsylvania.
"In an action for maliciously suing out a capias ad respondendum, the
plaintiff is estopped from denying the existence of a probable cause of action
by the fact that a judgment was rendered against him in the suit in whichi
he was arrested."
Herman vs. Brookerhoff 8 Watts 240.
While we might have applied this principle in the case at bar, we have
chosen to base our opinion upon other grounds. The able and exhaustive
and very satisfactory brief of the learned counsel for the defendant has aided
us very considerably in reaching our conclusion. The opinion of the court
Is that the prosecution upon which this action is based is founded upon prob-
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able cause as shown by the undisputed facts of the case therefore we direct
the jury to render a verdict for the defendant.
"If the admitted facts amount to probable cause, the court should direct
a verdict for the defendant."
Bruff vs. Kendrick 21 Super. 469.
Judgment accordingly.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The Watch had in fact been stolen. That it was subsequently recovered,
did not obliterate the theft. A roommate of Kelker informed Ginfort that
Kelker had committed the theft. Nothing is suggested that would indicate
that Gimfort ought to have disbeliev.ed the roommate. We see no error therefore in the decision by the court below that Gimfort had probable cause
for believing Kelker guilty. The evidence persuaded the jury that found Kelker guilty, hence Gimfort had probable cause for making the information.
The motive which inspired him tb make the information was composite.
Thot which inspires most informations is such. If a man has suffered from
an assault or a theft, etc., he is seldom actuated purely by a humanitarian
des:'e 1o repress crime generally, when he makes the information. Some
elenent nf grudge or vindictiveness usually accompanies the more elevated
feeling. Gimfort having quarreled with Kelker, was rather glad, having recovered his watch, that Kelker had given him an opportunity to cause him
trouble. There was then, a tinge of malice in his mind. However, malice
'
alone will not support the action. Along with it there must be a want of
l.robable cause.
Lipokicz v. Jervis, 209 Pa. 315; Beihofer v. Loeffert, 159
Pa. 365.
Although then Kelker was innocent, or, at least, as the action of the
court in setting aside the verdict of guilty, and that of the district attorney,
in entering a iolle prosequi, showed he could not be proven guilty, and although Gim fort was moved somewhat by a malicious feeling in instituting
the prosecution, since he was not shown to have been without probable
caus3. the court below properly refused to allow Kelker to obtain a verdict.

BOOK REVIEW
The Law of the Domestic Relations. By James Schouler; Little, Brown & Co.
Like the work just referred to this is an abridgement of an earlier work
by the same author. Its purpose is, to use words of the writer, "to supply
students and the professional lawyer alike with an elementary treatise
which may serve for study and practical use." The larger work has long
held a distinguished place in the legal literature of the country. A somewhat careful examination of this smaller book convinces us that It will be
extremely useful as a text book for students of law, and as a repertory of
general principles, with appropriate citations of authorities, helpful to the
practitioner. The chapter on the wife's separate property, is very Interesting
and able. No less useful are the chapters on marriage, the wife's debts and
contracts, her dominion over her separate property and her power to trade.
Dealing admirably with a subject of supreme and perennial importance, the
work is worthy of the highest praise.
The following will be reviewed In the November number:
The Law of Crimes. By John Wilder May, Little, Brown & Co.
The Law of Bailments. By James Schouler; Little, Brown & Co.

